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Awerbuch and Scheideler [2] have shown that peer-to-peer overlays networks can
only survive Byzantine attacks if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will
be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations.
A prerequisite for this condition to hold is to guarantee that nodes identifiers
randomness is continuously preserved. However targeted join/leave attacks may
quickly endanger the relevance of such an assumption. Inducing churn has been
shown to be the other fundamental ingredient to preserve randomness. Several
strategies based on these principles have been proposed. Most of them are based
on locally induced churn. However either they have been proven incorrect or
they involve a too high level of complexity to be practically acceptable [2]. The
other ones, based on globally induced churn, enforce limited lifetime for each
node in the system. However, these solutions keep the system in an unnecessary
hyper-activity, and thus need to impose strict restrictions on nodes joining rate
which clearly limit their applicability to open systems.
In this paper we propose to leverage the power of clustering to design a prov-
ably correct and practically usable solution that preserves randomness under an
-bounded adversary. Our solution relies on the clusterized version of peer-to-peer
overlays combined with a mechanism that allows the enforcement of limited nodes
lifetime. Clusterized versions of structured-based overlays [1,3] are such that clus-
ters of nodes substitute nodes at the vertices of the graph. Nodes are grouped
together according to some distance function. Our solution is based on the par-
titioning of the cluster population into two sets, called resp. core and spare sets.
Core members are responsible for implementing the overlay. By using classical
quorum-based active replication mechanisms among core members, the impact of
a minority of malicious nodes is easily masked. The spare set is used to reduce
the management overhead caused by the natural churn that is present in typical
overlay networks. Nodes in the spare set that leave the system cause next to no
overhead, and so do most of the nodes joining the system as they are inserted in
the spare set of their corresponding clusters. On the other hand, whenever a core
member leaves the system, new core and spare sets are possibly generated.
We propose two strategies to handle these leaves. These strategies mainly dif-
fer in the amount of randomisation they impose to introduce the unpredictability
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required to deal with attacks. In the first one, a coremember that leaves is replaced
by a randomly chosen spare member, while in the second one, the departure of a
core member leads to the renewal of the whole core set by randomly selecting new
core members within both core and spare sets. Then we model each strategy as a
game.
The long term behavior of both games is evaluated by using a homogeneous
Markov chain X = {Xn, n ≥ 0} that represents the evolution of the number of
malicious nodes in both core and spare sets of a cluster. Both games are played
against an adversary whose strength represents the amount of induced churn at
a cluster level. In its stronger version, the adversary is free to keep the nodes it
manipulates forever in the cluster, while in its weakest form, manipulated nodes
are forced to move (they can rejoin later if they wish). The adversary wins the
game when process X reaches a set of polluted states from which it can never
exit. A state is polluted if the fraction of malicious nodes in the core set exceeds
 (i.e., a collusion is mounted). A state that is not polluted is safe.
The first step of our work shows that the amount of randomization imple-
mented at cluster level does not prevent a strong adversary from winning in
both games in a bounded number of steps, however randomization together with
cluster size influence the speed at which this pollution is reached. In particular,
the second game alternates, for a random number of steps, between safe and
polluted states.
The second step evaluates the benefit of constraining the adversary by limiting
the sojourn time of its manipulated nodes in both sets, so that randomness
among manipulated and honest nodes is continuously preserved. We first show
that none of the games exhibit an absorbing class of states (i.e., both games
never ends). Next we prove that process X reaches a stationary distribution
which is surprisingly the same for both games. Specifically
Theorem 1. For both games 1 and 2, the stationary distribution is the same.
For all x = 0, . . . , c and y = 0, . . . , s, where c (resp. s) represents the upper
bound of the core (resp. spare) sets, we have
lim
n−→∞ {Xn = (x, y)} = α(x, y),
where
α(x, y) =
(
c
x
)
μx(1− μ)c−x(sy
)
μy(1− μ)s−y. (1)
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